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THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
CHAPTER I*
D E F 1 N 1 T 1 0 N :- According to the celebrated
definition of Chief Justice Marshall in the Dartmouth Col-
lege Case, corporations are defined to be, "artificial be-
ings, invisable, intangible, and existing only in contem-
plation of law";but in recent years, there has been, and in
most cases with much justice, a strong tendency from a
practical and business standpoint, to question the precise
accuracy of this definition, claiming that we should look
through the legal entity to the persons who compose the
same, thus treating the corporation for certain purposes as
substantially consisting of several natural beings, rather
than as one intangible artificial being. Such was practic-
ally the view taken when a corporation was held to be a
citizen for the purpose of jurisdiction, and again, when
held to be a person, so also in cases of fraudulent prac-
tices, etc.. In fact it would seem that a corporation is
nothing more nor less than a partnership with certain priv-
ileges and liabilities attached.
C L A S S i F I C A T I 0 N :- According to one
principle of classification, all corporations a:'e divided
into domestic or foreign, accordingly as they are organi-
zed or incorporated within or without the State,and by such
as are incorporated without the State, calied foreign corpo-
rations, are meant not only those incorporated in other na-
tions, but also such as are incorporated in other States of
the same nation.
Again foreign corporations may well be subdivided
for our convenience, into two great general classes , as
follows:
First:- Such as are engaged in commerce, interstate
or international.
Second:- All other foriegn corporations.
Corporations chartered by the general government,
such as national banks, certain railroad corporations, etc.
belong to neither of the above subdivisions, but rather,
should be treated as domestic corporations with certain ad-
ditional privileges, such as freedom from taxation on their
franchises, without consent of Congress, upon the ground
of their being agents of the government. ( Mc Culloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316,368; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9
Wheat., 738; Cal. v. R. R. Co., 127 U. S.,l;) However,
their property within the State is not exempt from an equal
taxation with all other property of that State. (Railroad
Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall., 5)
C 0 M I T Y :- Comity is a common law privilege or a
act of courtesy by which foreign corporations are allowed
to exercise their corporate powers in any or all of the
various States and nations. It is not a right but a mat-
ter of grace, that is, it rests in the will of the State.
Mortz . Vol. 11., #9,58 )
In general all foreign corporations whether of the
first or second class, may exercise by this common law
comity all corporate privileges given to them by their
charter, riot only in the State creating them, but also in
each or all of the several States of the Union, so long
as such exercise does not interfere with public policy or
laws, expressed or implied, of such other State or States.
In other words, while a State may not grant to a corpora-
tion a franchise(which is the conferring of special privi-
leges or immunities riot allowed to the community at large)
to be exercised as of right in another State, the laws of
a State having no extra-terrirorial effect, still by comity
Each state may and generally does extend to all duly incor-
porated foreign corporations, the legal right to carry on
its business within its jurisdiction. (Mort. Vol.II. #958)
This courtesy, as indicated, may be withheld at pleasure.
And why should it be otherwise? Why should the local laws
ocr one state be forced upon the people of another State?
Such would be inconsistent with State sovereighty.
As to foreigh corporations of the first class, with
one possible exception hereafter to be mentioned, they have
not only the common law right of comity but also a consti-
tutional right which can only be taken away by Congress
itself and with which the States have no right whatever to
interfere, while as to the second ciass, the right of com-
ity only is theirs, and even that right may be limited or
denied.
A reference to history would present many instances
of the e3xercise of this privilege among nations. Many cor-
porations organized in the United States have entered into
contracts with various foreign nations, but nowhere can a
decision be found in which the validity of these contracts
has ever been questioned by such foreign nations, and to
presume that the inforcement of the same will ever be de-
niod in America, on such grounds, could be based upon no
sound reasoning in view of t1e past history and present
trend of the American courts on this subject.
While this has uniformly passed unquestioned among
nations, yet in some of the very early cases it was earn-
estly contended that it had no application among the sev-
eral States; but later in the case of the Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 13 Pet., 586, it is stated that riot unly has it
an historical precedence -- that of usage -- but also num-
erous decisions from nearly all the States on which to base
this claim. Further, the court said: "The public and well-
known and long continued usage of trade; the general ac-
quiescence of the States; the particular legislation in
some of them, as well as the legislation of Congress -- all
recognize the existence of this principle."
Again in the case of Christian Union v. Yount, 101
U.S., 56, the court said: "In harmony with the general law
of comity obtaining among the States composing the Union,
the presumption should be indulged that the corporations of
one State not forbidden by the laws of its being, may
exercise within any other State the general powers conferred
by its own charter, unless it is prohibited from so doing,
either in the direct enactments of the latter State, or by
its public policy, to be deduced from the general course
of legislation or from the settled adjudications of its
highest courts."
Thus,again, its seems, as has often been said,
*silence gives consent".
C H A P T E R II.
TAXATI ON.
Section I;- Of such foreign corporations as are
not engaged in interstate or international commerce, i.e.
those of the second class.
Section II.- Of such foreign corporations as are
engaged in interstate or international commerce, i.e.
those of the first class.
SECTION I*
Taxation of Non-interstate or Non-international Foreign
Corporations
That such corporations may be taxed, as a matter
of law, can scarcely be questioned, but as to the grounds
upon which this conclusion has been reached and the extent
to which the same may be exercised, our attention will now
be turned.
In treating of this subject we will consider the
same in the following order:-
First:- The right of a State to tax a foreign
corporation as a condition precedent to its entering and
doing business within its territory, and the extent of
such taxation.
Second:- Its right to tax such foreigr co rporation
as are already legally within the State.
(First)
A solution of this first proposition involves, in
connection with the principles of comity, an answer to
the following question :
Is a corporation a citizen within the meaning of
that clause of the United States constitution whiah says
: " The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of the citizens in the several
States'?
Prdor to the &.doption of the constitution, there
was no provision by which either the citizens or corpora-
tions of one State were entitled to the privileges and rights
of.the samein other States The Articles of Confederation
were silent on this subject and Congress was powerless
to interfere , hence the matter: was left entirely in thu
9ntro 1 of the several States and such States -4ith thei- own
personal ends in view passed such laws as they saw fit.
Great *as the variety thereof.Much unfriendly and inmartial
legislation was promiscuously praotised throughout the Unit
ed Statesgiving rapid -cowth to a spirit of antaguni.r;.
Retaliation which to day is exercised among many
of the foreign countries seemed inevitably to be their con-
trolinr principle-a principle which can and could not be
consistently practiced among the citizens of those States
whose intention was to form one indistructable Union of
indistructable States". Harmony and uniformity, so essen-
tial to such a Union, were rapidly being displaced. An
(Union
ever widening gulf seemed inevitably to sunder that bond f
which were to bind them as one.
Such a condition of affairs furnished one of the
moving causes of the adoption of the present constitution.
Foreseeing the inevitable results, the framers of that
greatest of instruments, with much wisdom, introduced the
clause above referred to, namely: " The citizens of eac--
States shall be entitled to all privileges and imnmunities
of the citizens of the several States."
That no State has a right to interfere to prevent
any citizen from entering its State arid engaging in, as an
individual, in like mariner and on equal footing with its
own citizens, has since the incorporation of this clause into
the constitution never been questiored. And it was earnest
ly contended thatthe word "citizen", as there used,should,
in like mannerapply to a corporation; that no State should
be allowed to exclude, refuse to admit, or unjistly tax
amy such foreign corporation any more than a citizen of
another State. This led to an examination of the compar-
ative meanings of the word"corporation" and the word "citi-
zeng
Cooley 3ays; "The privileges arid immunities in said
clause belong only to State citizenship and which, were it
not for this clause, might be subject to hostile State leg-
isiation." Again, in Conner V. Elliott, 18 How., 591,
"According to the expressed words and clear meaning odf this
clause no privileges are secured by it but those which per-
tain to citizenship." As to the meaning of the term citi-
zen as here used and for proof that a corporation is not
considered a citizen within such meaning, no more authori-
tative references can be made than to the cases of Paul v.
ii
Virginia, 8 Wall., 168, and Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13
Pet., 586.
Of these two cases, the Paul case is generally cited
as the leading authority arid the opinion is perhaps one of the
most scholarly discussion e er written upon the subject,
and an extensive examinatio)n of the same may here be made
with profit, as involving both the subject of comity and
corporations. In this case the court said, "The term"cit-
izen"as here used,appliesonly to naturql persons, members
of the body politic, uwing allegiance to the State, and
not to corporations which are artificial persons created by
legislation and possessing only the attributes which legis-
lation,has prescribed. It was there ,further urged that as the
foreign corporation was composed of citizens of another
Btate, the courts should look behind the artificial being to
the real persons composing the same so asto afforC them
protection, citing an early decision, (2 How.4J7), but that
ease was expressly confined to a question of jurisdiction
ar did not extend to contracts,made by corporations. The
c.u-t said, "If it were to embrace contracts,and the mem-
bers of the corporation were to be regarded as individuals
carrying on business in the corporate name, and therefore
entitled to privileges of citizens, they must at the same time
take upon themselves the liability of citizens arid be bound
by their contracts in like manner: that the result of which
would be to make the corporation a mere partnership each
being individually liable for the debts of the corporation:
that the clause of the constitution could never intended
to give citizens of each State the privileges of citizens
of the several States and at the same time to have exempted
them from the liabilities attendant upon the exercise of
such privileges in those States for, this would be to give
the citizens of other States higher and greater privileges
than are enjoyed by the citizens of the State itself,and
would deprive each State of control over the granting of
franchises within the State. Extra-territorial operation
would be given to local legislation destroying the inde-
pendence and harmony of the States. Men of wealth from
other States would practically control the business of
these States. The only way to keep them out would be to
deprive their own citizens of the same priviiges."
I
Whenever a corporation makes a contract it is the
contract of the legal entity, the artificial being created
by its charter,and riot the contract of the individual
members thereof. The only rights it can claim are those
which are given to it in that character, arid riot the rights
which belongs to its members as citiz ens of a State • The
clause in estion doubtless was intended to place the cit-
izens of each State upon the same footin with citizens of
other States so far as the advantages resulting from citi-
zenship in these States are concerned. It relieves them
from the disabilities of alienage in other States;it inhib-
its dis criminating legislation against them by other State
it gives them the right of free ingress into the S tate
and egress from them, thus forming the present grand Union
without which it would have been little more than a league
of States. But the privileges and immunities secured to
citioens o" each State in the several States, by the pro-
Nision in question, are such as are common to the citizens
of the latter States under their constitution and laws by
virtue of their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed
by citizens in their own State are riot secured in other
States by this provision. This could not be expected.
It was not intended by it to give to the laws of one
State, any operation in other States. They have no such
operation except by the permission expressed or implied of
those States. The special privilege which they confer,
must, therefore, be enjoyed at home, unless the assent
of the other States to this enjoyment therein is given. A
grant of corporate existence is a grant of special priv-
ilegeto the corporation to enable it to act for certain
designated purposes as a single individual and exempting
it from individual liability. "The corporation being the
mere creature of local law can have no legal existence
beyond the limit of the sovereignty where created.As said in
Bank of Aug. v Earle"It must dwell in the place of its
creation and cannot migrate to anotier 5overeigrty."
The recognition of its existence even by other
States and the enforcement of its contracts make them de-
pend entirel$ upon the comity of those States; a comity
which is never granted when the existence of the corpora-
tion or the existence of its power is prejudicial to their
interests or repugnant to their policy."
Having no absolute right of recognition in other
States, but depending for such recognition and the enforce-
ment of its contracts upon their consentit follows, as a
matter of course, that such may be granted upon such terms
and conditions as those States may think proper to impose.
They may exclude the foreign corporation entirely; they
may restrict the business to particular localities or exact
such security for performance of its contracts with their
citizens, as in their judgement, will best promote the
public interest. The whole matter rests in their discre-
tion," They may tax them at their pleasure, without even
being questioned as to the imtive for the same. ( People v.
Phili. Fire Ins. Co. 92 N. Y. 311.)
The leading case of the Bank of Augusta v. Earle
13 Pet. 586., decided prior to the Paul Case and cited
therein, also holds that a corporation is not a citizen
and that it can have no extra-territorial operation except
as it is either expressly or impliedly granted.
While the same question had been up before the court
prior to the Paul and Georgia decisions, in the case of Head
v. Providence Irs. Co., 2 Craneh 127;also in the Dart-
mouth College Case 4 Wheat. 636, in both of which Chief
Justice Marshall wrote the opinion, and later in the case
of Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, besides in
numerous other eases since, yet it has always been with
the same result and invariably have the Paul and Geogia
been cited
cases/\ as standard authority whenever the exact question has
since appeared before the courts.
The leading case in New York on this subject is the
case of the People v. Phila. Fire iris. Co. 92 N. Y. 311,
cited above, in which a very able opinion was written by
Finch, J. - the same case being approved in Phila. Fire
Ins. Co. v. State 119 U. S. 110 * To the same effect is
the case of Pembina Min. "o. v. Pa. 125 U. S. 181, in
which Bradley, , quoted extensively from the Paul Case.
To the above rule, that any condition precedent,
may be required, there is the exception as already indica-
ted, that a State may riot demand, that a corporation shall
not appeal to the United States courts-a corporation for
that purpose being held to be a citizen and hence protected
by the U. S. Constitution.
Prior to 1844, no where either in England or America
had a corporation been so considered for any purpose, but
in that year the courts held in the case of Louisville R. IL. v.
Letsor, 2How. 497, that where a corpovationr is created by
laws of a certain State, it is legally presumed that its
members are citizens of that State, and that a suit by
or against such corporation is a suit agai rist citizens
of the State creating- it , >Jater this presumption was
held to be conclusive.(Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
Co. 16 How. 314; Covington Draw Bridge Co. v. Shepherd,
20 How. 227; R. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 6F5 ) Logically,
itwas but a step ! arthe- to hold that the members of a
foreign corporatioti are, in like manner, citizens of such
foreign State for the parpose of jurisdiction, and hence,
in suits by or against for eign corporations it amounted to
the citizens of bne State or the State itself against the
citizens of anouher State. S teamship Co. v. Tuginan
lO& U. S. 118. Arid further, that a State cannot restrain
a fleign corporation from resorting to Federal jurisdict-
ions see Iris. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Doyle v. Conti-
nental Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 535; also Barron v. Burnside, 121
U. S. L86.
It is in this class of decisions that we for the
first time, notice a tendency of the courts to look through
the corporate entity to the individual members composing
the sa-me.
From the above discussions we may extract the
following legal propositions:- that a corporation is not a
citizen within the meaning of that clause of the constitu-
tion which secures to the citizens o," 6ne state all the
privileges and immunities of the citiens in the several
States"; that a foreign corporation not engaged in inter-
state commerce has no ertra-territorial rights; that it
may, without obtaining express consent,exercise the privi-
leges granted to it by its charter, outide of the State
creating it, only by comity; that this comity is always
extended by the States unless contrary to public policy
or an expeess statute etc.; that a State may meet a for-
oign corporation at its border and demand as a prerequi-
site to its entering, any condition it may see fit to imposq
except that it may not interfere with its right of appeal
to the United States Courts; that itmay impose various
taxes and hence may absolutely refuse? admittance, for as
said by Chief Justice Marshall, "the power to taxincludes
the power to exclude", or that in substance.
From the above it would seem that the question is
not, as to whether a State may require of a foreign corpora-
tior, about to 'riter its jurisdiction, a condition preced-
ent, but rather as to whether the condition imposed is in
fact a condition precedent. This is well illustrated in
the case of People v. Phila. Fire Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 311,
a full discussion of which will appear later.
Recalling the real objects of the clause in ques-
tion, that one of the most important of them was to secure
the free right of the citizens of one State to carry on any
lawful business allowed to the citizens in other States,on
equal footing with such citizens in those States; tthat
it was to secure liberties and privileges and uniform laws;
and remembering that most of the business was then carried
on by citizens in their individual capacity; that the num-
erous great railroad, telegraph, and ;arge manufacturing
corporations of the present day, could scarcely have been in
contemplation of the framers of the constitutiozi,; that
in early times corporations wer considered strictly as
artificial beings etc., and looked upon with much distrust,
could we,in the light of all these factsreasonably expect
any other decision than was reached in the Paul and Virgii
ia cases, namely, that a corporation is not a citizen with-
the meaning of that word as above used?
But on the other hand, remembering that time often
makes many changes; that now, as said by BrJdley, J. "The
larger part of the business of this country has come to be
transacted by corporations which have been found, since th
earlier decisions of the Paul and Virginia cases, to be so
convenient, especiaily as avoiding a dissolution of member-
ship, while their most objectionable feature -non-liability
of members- has in most instances been abrogated in whole
or in part;" that since those early decisions corporations
have gradually come to be looked upon in a much different
light -the tendency being not to consider them so much as
artificial beings, but rather t6 look through the corporate
fictionto the members who actually compose the same- to
lcok at the effect rather than the form. Arid further, bear-
ing in mind, as said by Bradley, J., that" so strongly is
this modern view of a corporation feltthat, in the recent
case of Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., 118
U. S. 394, the doctrine that corporations are not citizens
or persons within the protective language of the constitu-
tion, was unanimously disproved, and the court expressly
held that they are entitled, as well as individuals, to the
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amend-
a
ment";that in effect tho same retalitory legislations which
were so destructible prior to the constitution and which
the clause in question in that instrument ospeciaily in-
tended to avoid, are to day being freely,exercised by all
the States with scarcely a restriction upon the same dis-
astrous results, whici then so 7tirr'ed the people; tl-at this
is brought about by th fact that the business that was theni
carried on by individual citizens whom the constitution
provided for, is to day, as referred to above, being con-
ducted almost entirely by corporations which are held not
to be citizens and hence not equally protected by the con-
stitution;ca1 we,in the faceof all this, come to an$ other
conclusion than that one of the principal effects of the
clause in question has practically, to a great extent
become nugatory?
In view of the above,may we not,with much reason,
question whether or riot a corporation should not 4n effect
be considered a citizen to the extent at least that the
corporations of one State may be entitled to all the privi-
leges etc .of the corporations in the several States? Why
is there riot to day the same reason for giving to the cor-
porations of ome State such privileges in the several State
as there was to give these corrosponding rights to the cit-
izens of the various States in the several States? Corpora-
tions are,in reality,nothing but a combination of citizens
for the purposes of facilitating business; nothing but a
partnership with certain additional privileges and liabil-
ities. This view is strongly favored in the above case,
holding a corporation to be a person, and again in those
cases holding it to be a citizen for the purposes of juris-
diction. Why if for such purposes, it may be hold to be a
person or a citizen, should riot the same reasoning entitle
it to be consideded a citizen for ether purposes-especially
taxation-arid thus allow them to freely enter the states
without complying with conditions precedent? Such a hold-
ing aould riot only seem reasonable, but i n the light of
the present tentency of the courts, would also seem to be
necessary that justice may be had. It would avoid many of
the practical injustices , hereafter to be mentioned, which
were intended to be prevented by hoiding that a corporation
was a person, and again it would furnish an amicable dispoF
al of many conflicting opinions in regard to interstate c( m-
merce corporations which will also be discussed later.
To bring about this change, that a corporation be consid-
ered a citizen , in the light of the many established
decisions uniformly kolding the contrary, arid the reluctan-
of the courts to reverse their own decisions, perhaps the
only practical wayof accomplishing the same would be by
amendment to the United 5tates Costitution.
(Second)
The extent to which a fore~grn corporation may be
taxed in this or any other State.
Assuming, for this purpose , that a foreign corpo-
ration is lawfully within this State, either by comity or
by complying with such conditions aw the State may right-
fully have imposed, the questions follow:
May such State tax it more severely than it does
its own domestic corporations, or may such foreign corpora-
tions refuse to submit to any greater burdens than are im-
posed on the ( mnestic corporations engaged in a like
business? May such foreign corporation demand equal
treatment and protection under that clause of the U. S.
constitution which says that 'no State shall deny to any
persin within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws," or in other words is a foreign corporation admitted
into tnis or any 6ther State a person within the meaning
of this clause?
That judges in interpreting the meaning of the va-
rious provisions of the U. S. constitution should investi-
gate the surrounding circumstances or emergencies giving
rise to the introduction of such provisionf that they
should endeavor to ascertain the intent of he framers of
th< same, by an examination of the debates in the consti-
tutional -.nd various State conventions and the discussions
in the Federalist, must be recognized as a generally
accepted and proper rule to follow (Cooley's Const. Law,
p 157)
Were this an absolute and inflexible rule, as claim-
ed by some, well might it be doubted whether a corporation
should be included in the clause in question, for while much
discord had arisen over the regulations of corporations
prior to that time, yet nowhere, in all the discussions
leading to the adoption of the same, can it be shown that
the subject of corporations r~ceiv- d any attention what-
over and perhaps it might seem strange that in the light of
these facts, had it been their intention to provide for the
same , that they did not give them at least a passing men-
tion. Especially would this seem natural, as some of the
courts at that ti;ne had held a contrary view to what is
now claimed. Ducit v. Chicago, 95 Am. Dec. and notes.)
Such were the arguments presented in the cases fol-
lowing the Fourteenth Amendment, in which the clause in
question may be found # As a matter of factthat corpora-
tions were riot discussed,can scarcely be questioned. In
the Slaughter House Cases 16 Wall. 56-81, one of the first
important cases on the subject on this subject, Chief Jus-
tice Miller said: "In the light of the recent history of
these Amendments (13, 14 and 15) and the Fervading purpose
of them which we have already discussed, it is not diffi-
cult to give a meaning to this clause. The existence of
laws in a State where newly emancipated negroee resided
which discriminated with gross injustice arid hardship
against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by
the clause and by it such laws are forbidden. Arid further
by way of dictum, he says: "We doubt much whether any action
of a State, riot directed by way of discrimination against
the negroes as a class, or on account of their race will
even be held to come within the purview of this clause."
While this dictum was much to,,broad a statement, we cannot
but perceive the courts convinced views as to the meaning df
this clause. Such were the cA-iims of many.
Granting t~iis to be true, it must still be bdrn in
mind that at the time if the apoption of this Amendment,
the people were in a highly excited state. There was one
thing uppermost and all-absorbing in their minds-the eman-
cipation of the receritly enslaved and oppressed negro.
Is it strange that under such a turmoil of excitement, in
regard to so important a subject, that a more subordinate
matter sho uld not have received direct attention? Arid
are we or that account, to presume that the framers were
entirely i., orant of the previous use and legal meaning of
the word "person"? or rather should we presume that in the
light of the fact that Blackstone treated of Corporations
under the head of " Rights of Persons," where he said, " Per-
soris also are divided by law into either natural persons v
or artificial" ( Book 1. 123) , and that a like view was
taken by Kent (11. Kent, 316 ), that they were not igno-
rant of this legal meaning:? Are we thus to impose upon the
great men of those days, and give a strict and narrow con-
struction to this word"person"? or are we to look at it
in a broader light and say that it may include Chinese,
and others similarly oppressed as well as the negro; that
t may include artificial as well as natural persons?
Suppose as a matter of fact, the authors of this
clause containing this word, did riot have in mind a corpora
tion, still the meaning of the word admitting of such a
construction, as shown by Blackstone, Kent and others, are
we to say, especially when necessity and justice shali demand
otherwise, that because it was not the expressed intention
of the framers, that the courts cannot so construe it, and
and thus possibly avoid the trouble and expense of another
amendment? Or is the rule of interpretation sufficiently
elastic in such cases to admit of using the word in its
full legal sense, regardless of the exact meaning inten-
ded? That is,at the most,all that would be done by includ-
ing corporations in the meaning of the word "persons", and
it is nothing more than what has o:ten been excercised
before, both in England and America.
Many instances will serve to illustrate the recogni-
tion of this right to expand the at first supposed limited
meaning of a word into its full meaning, as justice may
demand. Could we expect that a court which had already
declared that a corporation was a citizen for certain purpe
ses would decline to call it a person? Certainly riot, and
such a conclusion is eminently just. There would seem to
be no reason why a corporation which is composed of indi-
viduals should be denied the equal protection of the laws
or deprived of property without due process of law.
It would seem from this line of reasoning that the word
"person" should include a corporation, and in this conclu-
sion we are sustained by the decisions of many courts.
The first arid one of the most important cases upon
this subject and which sustains this conclusion is the case
of County of Sari Mateo v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co. , 16
Fed. 722, in which, Field, J., writing a very exaustive op-
inion,held that a corporation was such a person for the
purpose of protecting property and was entitled to the
equal protection of the law: that while metaphysically cor-
porations have been considered as artificial beings, etc
yet practically the courts should look behind the mere name
or entity to the persons who actually compose the same;
that they should look to the result or effect of such tax
and riot at the mere form, and that by so doing it is found
that, ihile the tax is said to be a t-.x on the property
of a mere artificial being etc., yet as a matter of fact
the effect is a tax upon the corporate property of the
individual stockholders who are actual persons and who,
should, ti erefore, be protected as such, so far as taxing
their properrty is concerned.
The theory once held, that a tax on a corporation
is not a tax upon the persons, or property of the corpo-
ratators or stockholders( 95 Am. D'-c. 520, arid notes) has
now with much reason ceased to be generally recognized,
for in reality the property of the corporation is nothing
more nor less than the property of the individuals, and a
tax on that property is a tax on the irLdividual's prop-
erty; for while it is claimed that the tax is paid out of
the corporate property, that being the individual's prop-
erty, it is actually paid by the individual.
It would seem that the same result might be reached
by considering the corporation as a domestic aorporation
after admission within the State, for admitting it by com-
ity or express condition, the State has thus substantially
adopted the charter of the foreigh corporation as if gran-
ted by the State itself, but this question has never seemed
to have received attention.
Since the decision in the leadirig case last cited,
the view there laid dowm, has ever since been uniformly
adheired to and notably in the following cases:-
10 Wall. 65,66; SantaClara Co. v. Southern
Pac. R. R. 118 U. S. 394; Pembina Mining Co. v.
125 U. S. 181; Charlotte, Augusta & Columbia R. R. Co. v.
Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386.
Yet it is claimed that there are corifli.titCg decis-
ions on this subject. it has many times been arg uL and
insisted that Duecat v. Chicago 10 Wall. 410, decided pric
to the Fourteenth A m:nd .en arid the Phila. Fire Ins. Co. v
New YOrk, 119 U. S. 110, de cided since, each support the
opposite view, i. e. that discrimination in taxation may
be made against foreigrn corporations within a State. How
ever, 1 think, that a careful examination of the same will
show that they may easily be harmonized with .he present law
as to Corporations, by showing that the question as to
whether a corporation is a person was not properly before
the courts in either of them, but rather that they furnish
excellent examples of the proposition that a State may impese
any conditi, n precedent to their enterinr the same.
In Ducat V Chicago, 10 Wall. 41C the State of 11.-
inois passed statutes requiring all oreigrn Insurance Com-
panies to comply with certain conditions as a prerequisite
to their engaging in business within tha State, and furthe;
if they should desire to carry on the same in the city 6f
Chicago, then in addition, they should pay two dollars on
every hundred dollairs of premiurn . -eceived. With the first
statute, the corporation complied, and entered and did
business in the State. Subsequently it also did business
in the city of Chicago, whereupon the tax 6f two dollars
was demande:i. Tne corporation 4efused to pay upon th.
ground that having complied with the conditiorns of the
first statute, it was already legally within the State, and
could riot be more severely taxed than the domestic corpo-
rations, relying on the constitutional provision in ques-
tion claiming that the State had violated the same by
requiring a greater tax from them than from the domestic
corporations doing a like business in Chicago. At first
this might seem to be true;but when it entered the State,
it was expressly understood that should it desire to
engage in business in Chicago, it could do so by paying the
additional tax. Therefore by fulfilling the first condi-
tion the corporation was admitted to all parts ef the State
except Chicago, and it knew that if it derired to carry on
business there, that then it must first comply with the ex-
tra conditions. On entering it, it impliedly consented so
to do; that otherwise it was riot lawfully within Chicago,
but only in such other parts of the State as were outside
of Chiaago, arid hence a tax of t¢¢o dollars was and might
lawfully be imposed as a condition precedent to its doing
business there, and therefore having done business there it
was accordingly liable for the same.
Again, in the case of the People v. PHila. Fire Ins.
Co. 311, and in Phila. Fire Ins. Co. -.. New fork, 119 U. S.
110, wi-ere the same case was approved, we, as a matter of
fact, find the same principle laid down. New York passed
a statute by which all foreign corporations desiring to do
business in this State should comply with such conditions
and pay such taxes as a condition precedent, as the State
from which it came should require of similar corporations
in
from our State desiring to do business their territory.
With this statute in view and knowing ai the liability of
a change,the Phila. Fire Ins. Co. FQAght admittance within
the State of New York and paid the tar imposed by a previo-is
statute of New York, which was a two r;Jrcenit tax, arid con-
tinued to carry on business for a year or two, when Penn-
sylvania passed a statute by which New York corporations
were obliged to pay a three percent tax , thus increasing
the tax already charged upon the Phii-E. Fire Iris. Co. by
one percent. The Company continued to do business for som
time after this additional imposition but did riot pay the
extra tax, whereupon New York brought action for the recov-
ery of the same. The company claimed that it was already
in the State, and had been there for some time prior to the
levying of the additional tax and that therefore such un-
equal tax was unlawful, under the constitutional clause
which aays th-It " rio State shalL deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". But
the court said that inasmuch as the State may impose any
condition precedent, it could at any time even revoke such
license and exclude the corporation entirely; that as a mat
ter of fact each certificate receiv4d gave the corporation
license to act for but one year arid that the end of each
year it .vias in law deemed out of thuState and must again
gain admittance arn! hence comply with the requisites of
that time;ad thiF ,iould seem to be eminentlg just for
otherwise different corporations from the same State might
be differently taxed, accordingly as they entered the State
under one statute or another. On continuing to do business
the corporation impliedly consented to such additional tax
as a prerequisite, and promise to pay the same in the futur
whereupon it was allowed to remain, the State , in effect,
agreeing to wave simply the right to immediate payment.
For example, should A desire to buy a horse of B, for which
B asked two hundred dollars, impiiedly B would mean two
hundred dollars in cash, and A would have no legal right
to take the horse without payirg for thessame, BAt is it
for a moment to be said that A and B cannot enLe: irto
an agree ment either express or implieq, by which A might
be allowed to take the horse immediately on agreeiri to pay
fovriit at some future time? i. e. May riot B waive imnme-
diate payment? Arid so, should B allow A to take the horse
without saying anything about payment of the two hundred
dollars, would it riot be presumed that A promises to pay
for it at any time when B should demand the same?B simply
waiving imrediate payment? And could A after getting pose-
ession of the horse, deny his promise arid still retain poss
ession of the same?
Such was the relation of the Philaz Fire Ins. Co. to
the State of New York, and it is with much logic, it would
seem, that the State was allowed to recover, inasmuch as th
the tax was a conditiri precedent to entrance into efa-c
State, the corporatiom *iaving no legal existence therein,
so far as t;at tax was coricerrie , ritil the same was paid.
Hence it riot being within the State when the tax was i -
levied, the claim that it was an unjust taxation, under
the clause in question is without foundation. As was well
said by Finch, J. in People v. Phila. Fire Ins. Co. supra,
"The Fourteenth Anendment can apply to foreign insurance
corporations, only after they have performed the conditions
upon which they are entitled to admission; Any ather view
of the case would involve this absurdity; that the company
may agree to pay the tax charged, so as to get within our
jurisdiction, and then refuse to pay it while insisting
upon the right to remain. it cannot agree to the condi-
tions and then after admission dispute them.
Thus it is seen that in neither the Ducat nor Phila.
casq, was the corporation in question within the State, and
hence that they furnish examples of unjust taxation of for-
eign corporations within the State, as claimed by some,
is not true. However they furnish good examples of the fact
that,that a State may require of such foreign corporations
a condition precedent to their entering such State is no
longer dispute4, but the question being rather as to wheth-
er the conditions in question are in fact conditions preced
ent.
From the above cases it would seem, that the word
"persons" as used in th Fourteenth Amendment includes
a foreign corporation;that such a decision has been reached
through a logical course of reasoning based on justice and
historical precedents; that while in framing the Fourteenth
Amendment its authors may, as has been said by an eminnt
lawyer have " builded wiser than they knew" yet we ate
not to be precluded freom any additional benefit which
may accrue there from; that in the absence of express terms
we are not to be confined to the use of a word in its lim-
ited meaning when justice and the developments of time
demand a more liberal construction.
REAL EFFECT:- While it has been the tendency of the
courts to hold that foreign corporations within a State
may riot be more severely taxed than the domestic corpora-
tions, yet, assuming this to be true, it would still seem,
if we look at the real effects and not at the mere form
that we have this anomolous situation,which cannot be
avoided under the present holdings of the courts, to wit:
that while a State may fully respect the constitutional
provision ," that no State shall deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws", still
it may, in effect, tax any foreign corporation to any extent
it may desire. From the fact that it may require any condi-
tion precedent, it may therefore refuse to license the cor-
poration for more than one year at a time, as in the Phila.
case, or for more than six months, or for any other length
of time, Thus at the end of each period, being legally
out of the state, the State inay as a condition of re-entrance
be again taxed unilimitedly at the discretion of the State.
What is the effect? Simply that at any time, by proper
planning,a State may tax any foreign corporation to any
amounts To be sure the corporation may stay out, but if it
does come in and continues to do business, nowhere in the
constitution can there be found a clause to prevent, in el-
fect, a State's practically taxing it every moment of its
stay, heavier than it taxes its own domestic corporations.
I can see no reason, if a corporation should enter New York
State this year, and lay out a large sum of money in any
kind of business, why New York may riot turn around and
practically destroy the greater portion of such property
by simply increasing the tax to such an extent as to make
the business unprofitable.
And further while corporations have been held to
be persons, yet by a close examination of the cases it may
be questioned whether any of them squarely hold that the
clause under consideration, includes corporations for the
purpose of taxation, for in nearly every instance the cor-
poration was found nut to be properly within the State.
If this be true nowhere in the United States constitution
can there be found a provision compelling the States to tax
equalty all property vrithin their jurisdiction. Arid in
some of the State constitutions there is no provision com-
pelling equal taxation. (Cooley's on Amer. Const. Law,317)
This is so in New York. Therefore it would seem, there
being no provision in the United States Constitution or in
The New York Constitution compelling equal taxation of prop
erty, that even after a cprporation has been properly ad-
mitted within this State, still the State is under no obli-
gation to tax it cqually with other corporations.
And again, were we to interpret the provision in q
question in view of the situation at which it was aimed
(the liberation of the slaves), were we to construe it in h
the light of the surrounding circumstarices, etc. at the
time of its adoption, as is the rule laid down by Brewer,J.
inthe late case of Rector v. U. S. 12 Supr. Ct. Rep. 511,
then might it well be questioned as to whether there are
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sufficient grounds for even holding a corporation to be a
person.
For the reasons above stated, especially the first
one, it is evident that the only way for foreign corpora-
tions to be certain of receiving fair treatment in the
future, is by considering them citizens. It may be argued
that the same objection as to uniform taxation applies to
a citizen. While this may be true, yet practicaliy, the
question will probably never arise. The government being
based upon the fundamental principles of equality,
the citizens would never submit to the same,were it
attempted.
Section II.
Control of Literstate Commerce Corporations
Under the confederation comnerceespeciaily inter-
state,was very loosely cortrolted. Congress had no power
whatever over the ii-tter; it was left entirely to the will
of each State to pass such laws as it might deem most desir
able in regard to all traffic and transportation through
its territory. This unlimited control in the several State
necessarily gave rise to a great variety of latzs upon the
subject, resulting in much discrimination among the differ-
ent States- each legislating with its own selfish ends in
view, passing such laws as would most increase its own inte
terests at the expense of the other States.
Naturally this selfishness developed a hostile and
bitter feeling, in consequence of which, much hardship was
experienced particularly by such States as were so situated
as to make it necessary fol: them to carry on their business
through other States. Such States were practically at the
mercy of those having particularly fine harbors and advan-
tages,.ind through which it was nec. ssary for them to pass.
Evidently this condition of affairs was destined to
br the source of continuing and increasing troubles, not in
accord with harmony and a "more perfect Union", unless some
means should be devised whereby an amicable disposal of
the matter might be had, and whereby out of discord harmo-
ny might reign.
The great men of those days were equal to the
occasion, and in this did they again find another great
cause for the t.option of the United States Constitution.
They saw that scl intimately concerned were the relations of
the people of the several States to each other that any
differences in legislation in respect to them,or any diver-
gency in judicial decision, might lead to infirite conten-
if left to comity alone
tions and mischiefs,A)and hence to avoid this thly embodied
in the constitution the following remedial clause'Congress
shall have power to regulate commerce bttween the nations ,
among the several States, and with the indian tribes."
By that inst rument such powers as were surrendered
to Congress, were denied to the States, and thus it was
hoped to place the matter beyond further discussion. But
not so-so determined was that selfish, antagonistic dispo-
sition, that nct without a thorough construction of this
clause were they to be contented. The great number of lit-
igated cases on this subject since, and the fact that some
of the States, having the best harbors for a time refused
to join the Unoin, because thereby they would lose that
unjust advantage which they then were excercising at the
expense of other States, both furnish the best evidence of
the natural and persistent dispositions of the States to
encroach upon this forbidden ground, and the wisdom, fore-
sight, and necessity of such a preventative cla us.
As to what constitutes a regulation of interstate
commerce had for some time caused much dispute. The variour
States from time to time,in desiring to get around the ef-
fects of this clause, haveppassed many ingeniously construcr,-
ed statutes, thd resu3ts of which have been to lead the
courts into various decisions more or less conflicting, asto
the scope of the same.
Commerce,to put it concisely, said Chief Justice Mar
shall,"is intercourse and communication irterstatebetween
States and international between rnations ", and further it
was said," to regulate commerce is t6 prescribe the rules
by which commerce is to be governed; that is7 the conditions
on which it shall be conducted'(Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pn -ra
114 U. S. 196-).
Commerce seems to have bee n divided by the d~cisiors
of the courts into two classes, namely: such as is local,
and such as is national in its character. The first inclu-
des matters properly local and such as are incidents and
aids t6 interstate commnerce; and the second, only such
matters as affect the public at large or are national.
From the wording of the clause it would seem , that
the power to regulate all coimerce,properly so called,
and that alone, and not such as is incidental and may be
justly a part of the police -ower of the States, rests in
Congress. So also , a history of the iiscussions at the
time of its adoption, would seem to bear us out in this
construction, the chief end being to establish one uniform
control over the whole matter and thus to correct the evil
of the existing authority in the several States and avoid
various discriminating laws .
Notwithstanding all this,as to the first class,the
courts have uniformly held, from Cooley v. Pennsylvania,
12 How. 299, down to the preaent, that the States and Con-
gress have concurrent jurisdiction, so that where a State h
has passed a statute, it will be held valid, if not in
conflict with public policy or some act of Congress on the
same subject. (Ward V. Maryland, 12 Wall., 418,430;Henderson
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v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259; Gloucester Ferry Co.
v. Penna. 114 U. S. 196; Wabash R. R . Co. v. Illinois, 118
U. S. 557; Miller on Const. 454 and cases cited.)
As to the second class, the courts have beri equally
uniform in ho'lding that Congress has exclusive juri~dictiort
and that when it has riot exercised its power, it is conelu-
siveeevidence that *Aintends the same shall remain free
from legislation. ( Pickard v. Pullman Palace Car Co. ,
118 U. S. 34; Pembina Mining Co. v. Penna. 125 U. S. 181).
In other wo rds , Congress alone has po rer to control com-
merce in matters susceptiAble of general and uniform regula-
tion;but that in matters that are effected by local legis-
latior, the power to regulate commerce is possessed by loth
the Federal and State legislatures, Congress being supreme
whenever acting.Phila.& Steamship Co. v. Penna.,122 U. S.
326; Pembina Mining Co. v. Penna. 125 U. S. 181; in the
latter case many authorities are cited sustaining both
propositions.)
one time
It may be interesting to note that at A United State
Courts held that this concurrent power applied the same
to the second class as it is now held that it applies to
first class. ( Pierce v. N. H., one of the License Cases,
5 Howard 564.)(
This ciassification,while not expressly stated, was
indicated by Johston J. in Gibbris v Ogden, 9 Wheat.,1,
and was expressly stated for the first time in Cooley v.
Penina., 12 How.299, which has ever since been the leading
authority. It held that the law regulating pilots arid
pilotage, though amounting to a regulationi of commerce,
not in conflict with an act of Congress,was valid. Cong-
-ress had to a limited extent regulated, the same, yet as
the State law did riot positively conflict with the acts of
Congress, it was held a valid exercise of State authority.
The broad rule was laid downthat "Whatever subjects of
this power are in their nature national or admit of only
one uniform system or plan of regulation may justly be
said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive reg-
ulation byr Corigr.3ss".
While this dlassification may do very wel.l for con-
venience, arid the re gulation as to the second class be
properly controlled by Congress alone as just stated, yet
as to the first clams, it would seem, bearing in mind the
principle that "the power not dfelegated to the U n.ted
States by the constitution nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States," that wel minght this righ
to concurrent power be )questioned. For as has well been
said:- "The power sought to be exercised is either delega-
ted or reserved;either exclusive in Congress or the States.
There is no middle ground." From a logical standpoint it
would seem that a truer statement was never made, and on
what grounds the courts can legally justify their deviation
from the same, is not easily to be discerned. The matter
should either be governed by the States and them alone, ur
by Congress and it alone. If it is local and belongs to
the police power, and does not in effect regulate commerce
among the States, then it is proper for the States to legis
late; but if it in reality does regulate commerce,then it
entirely outside the jurisdiction of the States, and Con-
gress only can control it. Were it otherwise it would ad-
mit as it does at present,of the usurpation of the powers
of the States!)by that of the general government, and vice
versa when Congress has not acted. An examination of the
cases show thid to be, in most instances, to the detriment
of the State Congress having power at any time to override
the statutes of the States, and in effect legislate upon
purely local matters. Yet it has not been without the
opposite result in many cases. Byfruch a holding much
trouble and dispute in a certain line 6f cases would be
avoided. There would, however, still remain the other
very perplexing question in a close case, as to whether it
should fall on one side or the other of the dividing line
between State and congressiona control, and to this we
will now turn our attention.
Upon this class of cases, while in general, the
United States courts have, with much accuracy, made many
just discriminations, still there has been a marked tenden-
cy , especially in the last few years,to give to the States
control over matters belonging absolutely to Congress.
That the courts are by no means settled on this subject, is
also e vident from the fact that in nearly every close case
from two to four of the judges have dissented.
An exa ination, in order, of the many interest-
ing and important cases wavering about t-is border line
would alford much profit, yet as this subject will not
per mit of so extensive a discussion, I can do no better
than torefer the reader to Cooley's Amer. Const. Law.pp. 69
69-74; 34 N. W. 1, especially the notes at page 11; 4 Harv.
Law Review, 221; 24 Am Law Review, 25; and other more r(-
cent references will be cited later, where collections
of many cases in )oint may be found, in which various de-
cisions gave beeri reached. By an exaiination of these, we
find evidence of two factions among the judges of the
United States Supreme Court; one holding strictly to what
would seem the better rule, that the only conditions or
taxes which a State may impose upon foreign corporatioa
engaged in interstate commerce, is that of a tax upon its
real and personal property actually having a situs mithin
the State. That such a tax may be levied has uniformly
been sustained.J The other view, being more liberal with
the States seems to have been gradually giving the States
greater powers. Step by step have they allowed a tax,
first on the property, the n in succession,on the capital
stock, business, franchise, etc., While it has no ,in each
case,been so galled , yet in effect it would seem to have
amounted to the same. Such have been the tendency of the
courts in the line of cases of which the more important
are the following: Tel. Co. v. Mass. 125 U. S. 530; West
ern Union Tel. Co. v. Atty Gen. of Mass. 141 U. S. 40; ard
Pullman Car Co . v. Penna. 141 U. S. 18; and Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Hayward, 141 U. S. 3. Vhile these cases thuF
far may possibly be harmonized upon the ground asfthe court
dec~ded, that it was a tax upon property within the State a
an(* ot upon a franchise or otherwise, yet it may be ques-
tic ied as to whether they were in every case well decided.
it would seem by an examination of the, Pullman Car Case
141 U. S. 18 and previous decisions, that the very strong
dissentir- opinion in that case should prevail, for nowhere
up to tlht time cam a decision be foun holding that prop-
erty in transit through a State into another has a situs
within such State through which it may pass.
In the recent case of Grand Trunk R. R. Co. v. Maine
142 U. S. 226, we find a climax to this class of decisions
It is a c ase that is attracting much attention among law-
ers and bids fair to be of continuing interest as well as
of great importance. W3 will therefore consider the same at
length.
The Grand Trunk is a foreign railroad corporation
organized in Canada with headquarters at Mortreal, and in
1853 it leased ofa Maine, corporation its railroad operating
through Maine, New Hampshire and into Vermont, thus forning
a through line from Canada through the States named. Sub-
sequently Maine passed a statute to the effect that every
corporation etc. operating a railroad in that State,should
pay to the State Treasurer for the use of the State, t"an
annual excise tax for the privilege of exercising its
franchise" in the State; such tax to be ascertained substan
tially by dividing the gross amount of receipts from trans
portation by the total number of miles operated and
multiplying this result by the number of miles in Maine. A
certain percentof this result constitutes the tax in ques-
tion. The company refused to pay the same on the ground
that it was an interference with interstate commnerce, and
hence this action by the State of Maine.
In a note on this case,it was well said:u The case
turned upon the question ef the right of a State to pass
statutes taxing the grosc receipts of a railroadfor each
mile operated within its limits regardless of the fact that
said road extended into other States and thus as it would
seem,was brought within the provisions of the constitution
as to regulations of interstate commerce as claimed by the
Grand Trunk. Nevertheless the Maine statute was held
constitutional on the ground that it provided an excise tax
for the privilege of excercising the railroads franchise
within the State, i. e. for the right to engage in the bus-
iness of transportation .
The prevailing and dissenting opinions in this case,
both seem to assume that a State has a right to tax the fra2,
chise of a foreign interstate commerce corporation, and
apparently the only difference in the two opinions is as to
the mode of levying the same. Were this strictly true it
would seem to be unimportant. It would seem to ha ve been
clearer if Judge Bradley had based his dissent upon the pl
plain ground, that a State has no right to tax a franchise
under such circumstances . This was really the basis of
his decision, although he may properly have argued that it
was not for him to say that the ingenuity &f man could, in
no way, invent a method by which such franchise might be
constitutionally taxed , for in reality it would in fact
seem inposible.
For convenience in the discussion of this case, we
will assume that a foreign corporation is organized and now
operating a railroad in the State of Pennsylvania an" is
desirous of entering New York for the purpose of carrying
on interstate commerce. The first question is, is it necesa
ry for the corporation to stop and knock at the door for
admission, or may it freely eriter therein without such
consent? Is it a right to which they are entitled or is
it asubject of comity which : , be denied? In general it may
be aaid that it is a right *vich cannot be denied to such
corporations . To this there might seem to be the posible
exception before referreKc! to and which would furnish the most
favorable argument in support of the Maine case,i. e. that
no railroad corporatiom engaging in or intending to engag-
in interstate cotunerce may lawfully enter the State of New
York or any other State for the purpose of carrying on or
engaging in interstate commerce without permissiom from 1
that State, for at the outset it would seem, before it can
lay a rail in that State,it must first obtain lawful poss-
ession of the land upon which to lay the same, and practia-
ally the only means of gaining the title to such land is
through the right of eminent domain, for while in some
instances it might possibly buy up te necessary lands of
the individuals owning the same , there !,ould still remainl
the practioal difficulties of obtaining the right to cross
public highways; and again, while it may be said that they
might purchase the railroads of corporations already organ-
ized in that State, still that could riot be dori- until the
S tate had given the corporation the right to sell the same
This right of eminent domain,they claim, is a sovereign
right resting absolutely in the sovereign power of the StLte
it, and exemption from taxation,and some others are extra-
ordinary franchises to which comity never extends and which
carn be gained only by the direct consent of the State. It
being a sovereign right,no other individual State ca n com-
pel the exercise thereof. Thus it would seem that in each
instance practically the consent of the State must be had.
Hence no State being under a compulsion to grant
the permission of cordemning prope rty,may withhold the same
entirely,or as would naturally follow, consent to the same
upon such conditions as it may sec fit to impose, such as
that it shall pay a certain sum for all property confiscated
that it shall take out a license, pay certain taxes upon it
its franchise, etc.. It is upon this reasoning that they i
miight best endeavor to sustain the validity of the tax in
the Maine caes, i.e. the right to levy a tax on a franchise
grrYtinF- the privile ge to carry on transportation within
arid through the State,though Lhis be interstate commerve.
This unlimited power to prescribe conditions precedent,
and hence that of taxation,would seem logically to be sus-
tained by the above reasoning. But riot so, for at this
point we are met face to face with another iine of argu-
ment which leads to an oppo~iite conclusion * Section VIII.
of Article I. of the United States Constitution reads as
follws: " Congress shall have power to regulate commmerce
between the nations, among the several States and with
with the Indian tribes@" What is granted to Congress by the
constitution is at the same time denied to the States.
Therefore whatever is meant by regulation of commerce, it
is certain that with that,the States have no riliht to inter
fere in any way whatever. That taxation is one of the most
conmon and most forcible means of re gulation, must be con-
ceded . Th at there can be no commerce without goods or
something to transport, and also that there can be none wil
out the transportation of the same,I submit must also be
conceded. The one is as an essential element to commerce
as theother; they are inseparable. Hence that a tax upon e
one is alsc a tax upon the otrlermust without queition be
ar!-nowledged, and to say that tax upom either or both would
be a tax upon commerce, would be so entirely self evident
as to become superfluous. That a tax upon the right of
transportation or a franchise granting the same as in the
Maine case, is also a tax upon the transportation itself
and hence as above shown upom commerce and upon the gross
recti~ts upon which the same is estimated,is an evitable
conclusion. A tax upon comnmerce is a regulation upon com-
merce which belongs exclusively to Congress, and if exer-
cised by a State,as in the Maine case,is unconstitutional.
Wetherefore.,from these two lines of ressoninE
come to the conclusion, that while a State is said to be
sovereign in its power,it is only so, so far as these pow-
ers have not been delegated to the general government, and
when so delegated as is the regulation of commercethen the
exercise of' the same by the State becomes unconstitutional
and of no effect.
said,
Againas has beenany condition precedent to the en-
trance within the State of a foreign corporation not engagd
in interstate commerce, may be imposed; but to this, a
corporatoonbeing Yield a person for the purpose of juris-
diction there is found to be an exception decided in the ca
case of Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 535, where
the State imposed a condition that no corporEtion shuld
appeal any case to the United States Courts. It was held
that a corporation for this purpose being a citizenpand
the constitution providing that no citizen in such cases
shall be ceprived of the right of appeal to those courts,
that the condition was unconstitutional and void and could
not be enforced. In other words while a State may impose
any condition precedent as a privilege of entering the Sta.te
such condition must riot be in conflict with the provisions
of the United States Constitution, for that is supreme and
to that each State must bow. So while State may not be compel
led to exercise the right of eminent domain, yet in exercie
ing it, it cannot annex any unconstitutional condition.
Hence a tax on a franchise for the right of tra isportati n
being a tax on transportation and therefore on commerce
cannot be imposed as in the Maine case, it being a regula'-
tion of commerce, which is under the control of Congress
alone.
As to eminent domain,we may conclude that no State
can refuse admittance to a foreign corporation engaged in
interstate commerce by a direct act on its part; neither
can it be compelled to act and grant this right in order
that a corporation may enter for the purpose of carrying
on commerce . By its silenrce,it might seem to be able to
keep such a corporation out , but it must be remembered
that the general government in its supreme power nay exer-
cise this right for all public purposes and grant the same
to corporations engaged in interstate commerce, whether
they be organized by the government itself, or created by
one of the States. It may take hold itself and exercise L
this power but it canrnot compel the States to exercise it.
A State cannot be mandamused. This view is upheld in the
case of Stockton v.Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. Vol. I Inter
state Coum.rce Reports 411. In that case the Staten Island
Rapid Tr ansit R. R. Co., by act of Congress was authorized
to build a bridge accross " Arthur Kill, a sound between
Staten Island and New Jersey. The corporation was created
in New York and Crongress granted this right of eminent
domain. The court held it to be a lawful exercise of the
same, and while this exercise was over a river, yet the
courts said that the right would be the same over land.
Were this right denied to Congeess, then scarcely a
case could arise where the consent of the State must not
first be obtained before carrying on interstate commerce.
And effective barrier would thus be interposed to the exec-
ution of the constitutionai power vested in Congress.
Again by the weight of authority it would seem that
that sane conclusion would be reached in regard to the
Maine case.
Should an individual, a partnership, an association,
in fact any one or any thing short of a corporation, engege
in interstate commerce, never for a moment, would the rigt.
of a State to tax the same for such privilege, or in any
manner whatever other than to tax the property actually
having a situs within the State , be claimed.
What authority there is for singling out a corpora-
tion, by means of which mos t or all of this kind of bus-
iness is carried on, and taxing it freely is a question
difficult to answer. The clause in question says that Con-
gress shall have power to regulate commerce. It does not
say or mean simply when it is carried on in any particular
manner or by any particular person, but rather in all cases
whether by a citizen or corporation
In Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pnrina. 114 U. S. 196,
the court said : "Interstate commerc,, by a corporation tr
is entitled to the same protection against State exaction
which is given to sucb commerce when carrie on by individ
uals."
When thiE .lause was adopted there were in existences
as stated in Banr: of Augusta v. Earle, 15 Pet. 519, many
large corporations carrying on this business between nations
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arid the court in that case after enumerating some of the
corporations so engaged, suid: "This state of facts forbids
it
the supposition that was intended in the grant to Congress,
to exclude from its control the comnrece of corporations.
The language of the grant makes mo reference to the instru-
mentalities by which commerce may be carried on; it is ger-
eral and includes alike commerce by individuals, partner-
ships, associations, and corporations." Again, the powel
given to Congress to regulate commerce is not confined to
the instrumentalities of commerce known or in use when the
constitution was adopted, but keeps pace with the progresz
of the country and adapts itself to the new developments of
time and the surrounding circumstances. (Pensacola Tel. Co.
v. Wertern Union Tel. Co. 6 Otto, 1-24.)
In Crutcher v. Comm. of Ky. 141 U. S. 47, the court
said: "If a parttership firm of individuals should under-
take to carry on the business of interstate comnerce be-
tween Kentuckey and other States, it would riot be within th
the province of the State legislature to exact conditions
on which t hey should carry on their business, nor to
require them to take out a license therefor. To carry on
interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege
granted by tha State; it is a right which every citizen of
theUhited States is entitled to exercise under the consti-
tution arad laws of the United States; and the accession of
mere corporate facilities as a matter of coravenience in
carrying on their business cannot have the effect of depriv
irig them of such right, unless Couigress shall see fit to
interpose some contrary regulation on the subject."
Again in the Gloucester Case the court said: " While
it is conceded that the property in a State belonging to
a foreign vorporation engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce may be taxed equally with like property of a domestic
corporation engaged in that business, we are clear that a
tax or other burden imposed on the property of either corpo
ration because it is used to carry on that commerce, or
upon the transportation of persons or property,-- is
invalid and void as an interference with and an obstruct-
ion of the powers of Congress in the regulation of such
commerce." Again in the Puliman Car Case the court said:
"Much reliance is also placed by the plaintiff in error
upon tne cases in which this court has decided that citizen
or corp rations of one State cannot be taxed by another 4
State, for a license or privilege to carry on inters tate
or foreign commerce within its limits. But in each of those
cases,the tax was riot upon the property employed in the
businessbut upon the right to carry on the business at ali,
and was therefore held to impose a direct burden upon the
commerce itself. (Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69; Pick-
ard v. Car Co. 117 U. S. 34; Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120
U. S. 4,S9; Leloup v o Mobile, 127 u. S., 64.)
In Leloup v. Mobile, overruling Osburn v. Mobile, a
case cited by plaintiffs attorney in the Maine Casethe
courts held that a license tax upon a Telegraph Co. 1 engaged
in sending messages within and without the State was void.
The broad rule was laid down "That no State has a right to
lay a tax on interstate cormnerce in any form, whether by
way of duties laid on transportation of the subjects of
that cornerce , or on the receipts derived from that trans-
portation , or on the occupation or business of carrying
it on, and the reason is that such taxation is a burden on
that commerce and amounts to a regulation of it." To the
same effect is the case of Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129,
A case exactly in point would seem to be the Crutch-
er case,above cited. The trial and argument of this cise
was based solely upon an agreed statement of facts, in
which it was specifically settledthat for the purposes of
this case, the express company was to be considered as
a foreign corporation, rio matter what it was in fact, arid
confining ,hemselves to this agreement the court held that
a Kentucky statute requiring that an agent of the United
States Expr'ess Company, before it shall be allowed to enter
thatS tate and solicit business for that Company , should
take out a license , was unconstitutional arid void as an
interference with interstate coninel'ce. To the same sub-
stantial effect w.s R. R. Co. v. .:nia, 136U. S. 114. It
is claimed that these cases are not in point,because, unless
the conditions imposed are complied with , the corporation
would be prevented from engaging irn interstate commerce,
while in the Maine Case, the State does riot say that they
cannot come in and engage in interstate commerce, but rathe
that after they are in and so engaged , that they claim the
right to tax them. This argument would seem to be very
immaterial, for iri either, case the tax if paid, ould have
the same ef4!ect; t would amount to a tax on connerce.
The only case ci 4d in suppof't of the prevailing
opinion in the Maine Case ,was that of an irsurance company
and as insurance companies are riot held to be e ngaged in
interstate commerce, it would riot seem to be in point.
Another case which the attorneys for the State placed much
reliance upon, is that of the State tax on RAilway G! oss
Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, but this case has been practically
overruled in the Steamship Co. v. Penna. 122 U. S. 326,
also in Fargo v. Mich. 121 U. S. 230, arid numerous other
cases which might be cited.Besides the State Tix Cases
were really decided upon the ground that it was a tax upon
the gross receipts after they had been mingled with the prop-
erty of the State, the corporation being a domestic corpo-
ration. Therefore, it could not be in point, for in the
Maine Case the corporation was a foreign corp. with its head-
quarters at Montreal, and in all probabilities no part of
the gross receipts ever became mingled with the property
in the State of Maine.
Many more cases might be cited supporting the view
taken but most of the m may be found cited in those al-
ready ref-_red to.
Again, it is argued that the privilege of carrying
on interstate commerce through Maine, may be taxed as such
within that State, but as above seen,,in the Crutcher case,
the right te engage in commerce is no a franchise. The ,t
corporation does not need a franchise for that purpose; it
is a right secured to it by the U. S. Constitution. If it
does riot need it, it certainly can have no value, and
being of no value, it lacks one of the necessary elements
of proserty, and hence cannot be taxed as such.
From the above we may draw the conclusion that while
there is one class odf decisions, holding strictly that the
only tax which a State may impose upom a foreign corporatin
engaged in interstate commerce, is that of a tax upon its
propertyactually having a situs within the State, and that
equally with other property, yet there is also an increas-
ing line of decisions, holding that it may tax its property
chartercapital stock, etc., and as a climax to the whole,
according to the Maine case, it may tax its franchise and
the gross receipts. In regard to this case Bradley, J.,
in his dissenting opinion, said: " It comes to this: A Stat
may tax a railroad company upom its gross receipts in pro-
portion to the number of miles run within tke State as a
tax on its property, and may also lay a tax upon these same
gross receipts in proportion to the same number of miles
ror the privilege of exercising its franchise in the State."
for
And further, he says, I know not what else it may not be
taxed.
It would seem from the above that a State Yiiy even
practically exclude such corporations entirely by 3imply
increasing the tax, and if that would riot amount lo a tax
upon commerce,then it would be difficult to know what
would. It would seem that the effect of the commercial cl
clause of the U. S. Constitution is thus substantially
wiped out.
How tne Maine and Crutcher cases can be harmonized
how the Pullman Car and Pickard cases , and others can be
harmonized, is difficult to ascertain* It would seem, in
effect at least, that they cannot be.
Thus it appears, that on so important a subject as
this, the United States courts are in hopeless confusion,
with a strong tendency favoring the control of the matter
by the States. It would seem, that the same unlimited power
and distructive effects existing under the Confederacy and
which gave rise in part to the adoption of the constitu-
tion are destihed to again appear; that retaliation may be
freely exercised among the States; The disasterous exper-
iences during that perio are not involved in obscurity.
That something shoald be done to check this tendency
is evident. What it shall be is the next question.
Scarcely could we expect, the courts, with an ever-changing
personnel,to effect this change with a sufficient degree of
pe rmanenc y.
It would seem that the better way would be, by an
act of Congress requiring every corporation, intending to
so engage to organize under a general statute of the United
States, such corpor ations so organized being unquestion-
ably free from these objections. But better stiii, as be-
fore suggested, would be an amendment to the United States
Constitution, to the effect that a corporation be consider-
ed a citizen.
In either case it should be based on the principles,
as Bradley, J., says: "That the power of Congress is su-
preme over the whole subject, unimpeded and unimbarrassed
by State lines or State laws; that in this matter the coun-
try is one, and the work to be accomplished is national;
and that State interests, State jealousies, and State pre*-
judicies do not require to be consulted. In matters of
foreign and interstate commerce there are no St.te s."
